Firms raise external …nance via monitored bank loans and non-monitored borrowing in a dynamic general equilibrium model. Access to credit and each type of …nancing depend on the wealth distribution due to moral hazard. We study the depth of credit markets (…nancial development) and conditions under which the …nancial system relies more on either type of external …nance (…nancial structure). Initial inequality, investment size and institutional factors determine the level of …nancial development, while Kunal Sengupta, Steve Turnovsky, Yong Wang and seminar participants at various places this paper was presented. We are especially grateful to the co-editor, Carl Chiarella, an associate editor and two anonymous referees of this journal for comments and suggestions. All remaining errors are ours.
Introduction
Systematic evidence over the last decade has documented a robust and positive relationship between …nance and economic development. 1 This positive relationship motivates our paper.
But our interest goes deeper, into the roles various participants play in the …nancial system.
We begin with the century-old debate on the e¢ cacy of banks versus …nancial markets.
Some commentators have cited Germany and Japan's experience to argue that banks are better at mobilizing savings, identifying good investment and exercising corporate control.
Observers on the other side of the debate point to the UK and US as evidence that …nancial markets have an advantage over banks in information acquisition, corporate control and risk management.
This debate is as relevant today as it was historically. A global trend, favoring …nancial markets, has emerged over the last two decades. This is true even in traditionally bankbased developed countries like France and Japan which have increased the role of …nancial markets since the mid-eighties (Allen and Gale, 2000) . In developing and transition countries, market-…nance is …nding increasing favor as banking crises have become widespread and as government interventions, particularly in the banking sector, have been thoroughly discredited (Allen and Gale, 2000, Holmstrom, 1996, Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine, 2001a ).
Yet, as Allen and Gale (2000) point out, it is unclear why …nancial markets are suddenly seen as the panacea. Missing from the global policy debate is a clear understanding of the dynamic implications of each type of …nancial system and, more speci…cally, how the …nancial system itself evolves. So our primary goal is to write down and analyze an explicit dynamic model of …nancial structure. We see this as a necessary step to addressing policy issues raised by the bank-versus-market debate, especially in developing and transition economies.
What We Do
The bene…ts of a …nancial system depend on the degree to which external …nance facilitates industrialization. But in a second-best world infested with credit frictions, access to credit is constrained by wealth levels and internal asset positions of individuals and …rms. There is thus an intimate connection between the wealth distribution and …nancial development.
We construct a dynamic model that incorporates this interdependence.
In the model, manufacturing requires large-scale investment which cannot be funded by internal assets only. Potential entrepreneurs may borrow using monitored bank loans (bank …nance) or non-monitored sources like bonds and equities (market …nance) or a combination 1 See Levine (2005) for an up-to-date survey of this literature.
of the two. Credit frictions arise because owner-managers of manufacturing …rms may choose an inferior technology in order to enjoy private bene…ts. The incentive to do so is greater the lower the personal stake an owner has in her investment project (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997) .
Under this incentive problem, wealth thresholds determine who invests and the kind of …nancial instruments they use. Poorer individuals do not obtain any funding since they cannot guarantee lenders the required return; they instead work for a wage. Others obtain loans and produce capital using a risky technology. When investment succeeds, these capitalists hire workers to operate the machinery and produce a …nal good. Among capitalists, wealth thresholds again determine how they borrow. Individuals of medium wealth levels are able to borrow only through a combination of intermediated (bank) and unintermediated (market)
…nance. Bank …nance entails monitoring that partially eliminates the incentive problem;
perceiving this, direct lenders are willing to lend. 2 Capitalists who are wealthy enough, on the other hand, do not have to be monitored and use only market …nance.
In this way the wealth distribution determines access to credit markets (…nancial depth) and dependence on each type of external …nance (…nancial structure). The wage earners who were rationed out of the credit market may ultimately accumulate enough assets to become capitalists. Whether or not this happens depends on their labor income, which in turn depends on the extent of industrialization. At the same time today's capitalists may …nd themselves denied access to credit in the future if they su¤er losses on their current investment.
Main Findings
The dynamic interplay of the wealth distribution and borrowing choices determines the path of …nancial development and structure. We identify initial inequality, investment size and institutional factors as key determinants of …nancial development, while …nancial structure is shaped by investment technology and the nature of its legal and …nancial institutions.
An unequal distribution, speci…cally a large peasant population relative to capitalists, hurts …nancial development since few individuals obtain credit. The sparse industrialization that results from this prevents workers from accumulating enough to access credit markets in the future. Low to moderate degrees of inequality, however, see the emergence of developed …nancial systems. Even then, …nancial depth is negatively related to inequality, a prediction consistent with evidence from a cross-section of countries. Initial inequality also impacts an economy's historical …nancial structure -by reducing dependence on monitored …nance it results in more market-oriented …nancial systems, a pattern we observed during Western
Europe's industrialization.
The investment technology plays a vital role. When investment requirements are too large relative to average wealth levels, fewer individuals obtain credit: industrialization and …nancial development remain low. Larger capital requirements also promote a bank-based …nancial system, at least during the initial stages of …nancial development. This outcome matches well Western Europe's historical experience. In particular, the British industrial revolution occurred in industries, textiles for example, that did not call for enormous investments (Landes, 1969) . Germany, in contrast, was involved in heavy manufacturing and chemicals, both of which required large injections of external capital. Such technological di¤erences could have played a key role in Britain's historical reliance on market …nance and Germany's dependence upon its banking systems (Baliga and Polak, 2004 ).
We show that investment technologies that are riskier are more conducive to marketbased systems because a larger proportion of capitalists can accumulate enough assets to shed their reliance on bank intermediation. Finally, institutional factors like agency costs shape a …nancial system in intuitively plausible ways. Bank-based systems result when bank monitoring is particularly e¢ cient in resolving agency problems, although it depends upon monitoring costs as well. Our theoretical results lend credence to recent empirical evidence, LaPorta et al. (1997, 1998) and Levine (2002) in particular, that shows institutional and legal factors to be important determinants of …nancial structure.
Recent Related Literature
This paper contributes to the emerging literature pioneered by Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Galor and Zeira (1993) on the dynamic link between credit frictions and wealth distribution. 3 Similar to some of these papers, an important feature of our model is the dependence of factor prices on wealth distribution. In general, such dependence can give rise to complicated non-linear dynamics (see for example Aghion and Bolton (1997) ). An advantage of our framework is its ability to circumvent this problem and ‡esh out interesting and empirically plausible predictions regarding …nancial development.
The key innovation we bring to this literature is a rich …nancial structure and a fuller understanding of the determinants of …nancial development. Treatment of …nancial systems in the existing literature is incomplete since its main goal has been to characterize distributional dynamics or study occupational choices. What is missing, speci…cally, is the variety 3 Recent work in this area include Aghion and Bolton (1997), Piketty (1997) and Mookherjee and Ray (2002) .
of …nancing choices that …rms typically face. In contrast, our interest lies …rst and foremost in these choices and how they shape the development and structure of …nancial systems. 4 At the other end of the spectrum lies the corporate …nance literature on …rm …nancing choices. This literature usually deals with static (often partial equilibrium) models of developed …nancial systems. Conclusions about developing societies are hard to infer, even though …nancial reforms in developing countries have borrowed extensively from the experience of developed systems.
We draw insights from Diamond (1991) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) which analyze the link between …rm …nancing choices and some form of asset distribution. Diamond (1991) considers how a …rm switches from expensive (and monitored) bank …nance to cheaper forms such as public debt as it develops a better reputation, which of course is a form of asset.
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), whose incentive structure we adopt here, observe how incentive problems and access to di¤erent types of external …nance depend on a …rm's internal assets.
Neither of these papers incorporate the feedback that macro-fundamentals have on …nancing choices. Once these are taken into account, we show how the typical life-cycle story of …rm …nancing choices, as articulated by the …nance literature, can fall apart unless initial conditions and policy parameters are appropriate for long-run …nancial development.
Finally, our paper is related to Baliga and Polak (2004) who analyze a static partialequilibrium model in which all …rms borrow using either monitored or non-monitored debt (but not both, as in this paper). They discuss how investment size and entrepreneurial wealth explain the historical development of the Anglo-Saxon and German …nancial systems. Our dynamic model shows that the relationship between …rm …nancing choices and investment size (wealth) posited by Baliga and Polak is temporary, relevant only during the initial stages of development. The relationship disappears in the long-run unless investment size (wealth)
gives rise to history-dependence, in which case the very process of …nancial development can be crippled.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is developed in section 2 and optimal 4 Greenwood and Smith (1997) study a dynamic model of banks and equity markets. They are interested in how these two types of external …nancing emerge endogenously to facilitate growth through liquidity provision and specialization. The key di¤erences with our paper are that banks exist here to address agency problems and our focus in on how the mix of two types of external …nance -what we call …nancial structure -changes over time. We are also primarily interested in the demand for various types of external …nance (the supply side is a sideshow) and abstract from growth issues (see Chakraborty and Ray, 2006 
The Model
Consider a small open economy populated by a continuum of agents of measure one. Time is continuous and successive generations are connected by a bequest motive.
An agent is born with an initial wealth, a, received as bequest from her parent and a labor time endowment of one unit. This labor can be either supplied inelastically to the labor market or used to oversee an investment project that produces capital. Inheritance is the sole source of heterogeneity among newly borns. We denote the cumulative distribution of agents at t by G t (a) and assume that the initial distribution G 0 is continuous and di¤erentiable.
Preferences are given by the "warm-glow"utility function:
where c denotes consumption and b denotes bequest left to o¤spring. Given a realized income z, optimal consumption and bequests are linear functions of z:
The indirect utility function is then also linear in income, U t = 'z t with '
1 , implying that agents are risk-neutral.
Similar to Banerjee and Newman (1993) , newly born agents become economically active only when they become 'mature'. Time to maturity, T , is distributed exponentially with the density function h(T ) = e T , > 0, across members of the same cohort. All economic activity occurs at the instant an agent becomes mature: she chooses her occupation and earns income accordingly, gives birth to one o¤spring, consumes, leaves bequests and dies.
There is thus no population growth and members of a cohort do not all die at the same time. Without loss of generality we set = 1 so that agents live for a unit length of time on average.
Production and Occupation
Whether or not an individual is a worker or a capitalist is determined by access to external …nance. Production of capital requires an indivisible investment of size q. Only individuals able to raise the requisite funds (from internal and external sources) become capitalists, the rest join the labor force.
A worker supplies her unit labor endowment to the labor market, earning a wage income w t . A capitalist's income, on the other hand, is uncertain. In particular the investment project is risky -a successful project yields capital amounting to q ( > 1), while failure yields nothing. Successful capitalists become producers of …nal goods by hiring workers to operate the capital. This capital depreciates completely upon use.
Markets for the …nal good and for labor are perfectly competitive. We assume an ArrowRomer type technological spillover in the …nal goods sector. Speci…cally, for a successful capitalist j, the private technology for producing the unique consumption good is constant returns to scale in private inputs:
Here A t denotes time-dependent labor-e¢ ciency that is common to all …nal goods producers. Labor e¢ ciency A depends upon capital per worker, k, through a learning-by-doing externality:
Productivity improvements in any particular …rm spills over instantaneously to the rest of the economy, becoming public knowledge. The social (intensive-form) production function is thus an Ak type technology y t = Ak t , where A Â 1 .
It remains to characterize the investment decision facing a potential capitalist. An individual with assets a t < q can become a capitalist only if she is able to borrow the shortfall q a t . To obtain a rich …nancial structure, we introduce an agency problem similar to that in Holmstrom (1996) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) .
Speci…cally, the probability of success of investment depends upon an unobserved action taken by the capitalist -her choice on how to spend q. She can spend it on an e¢ cient technology that yields q units of capital with probability G , but uses up all of q: Alternatively, she can spend it on one of two ine¢ cient technologies. One of these technologies is a low moral hazard project, costing q vq, leaving vq for the capitalist to appropriate. This project too yields q units of capital when it succeeds, but it succeeds less often, with probability B < G . The other ine¢ cient technology is a high moral-hazard project, costing q V q. This leaves V q in private bene…ts.
Both ine¢ cient technologies carry the same probability of success, B , but since 0 < v < V < 1 by assumption, the capitalist would prefer the high moral-hazard project over the low moral-hazard one. Only the e¢ cient technology is, however, economically viable. 5 The table below summarizes these investment choices. Supply of loans in the domestic …nancial sector comes from two sources: through …nancial intermediaries or banks, and directly from workers and international investors. Workers are indi¤erent between bank deposits, lending directly to capitalists and investing on the international capital market as long as all three yield an expected return of r . In other words, r is the return that banks promise their depositors as well as the expected return on direct lending. 6 On the demand side, loans are obtained by individuals who invest in the production of capital; they invest their entire wealth, borrowing the remainder from the domestic …nancial sector. Credit-constrained agents work for the capitalists. They deposit their wealth with banks or lend directly to domestic capitalists or the international capital market.
Capitalists face a perfectly elastic supply curve of loanable funds since they can freely access the international capital market. Availability of domestic investable resources therefore does not concern us. What matters is how capitalists borrow. Direct borrowing from 5 To ensure this we assume G A q r q > 0 > B A q r q + V q. Here r is the world return on investment and we anticipate that a successful capitalist's return per unit capital produced, t , equals A in equilibrium (see equation (11) 
Optimal Contracts
Faced with the incentive problem outlined above, a capitalist will behave diligently to the extent that she receives an incentive-compatible expected payo¤ and whether or not she is monitored.
Consider the …nancing options a prospective capitalist faces in borrowing from banks or from the market. Since banks monitor …rms while outside investors do not, we shall refer to the former as informed investors. We consider optimal contracts that induce capitalists to invest in the good project.
Direct Finance
An optimal contract between a capitalist and direct …nanciers has a simple structure. Capitalisti invests her entire wealth, a i t , in her own project since that yields a return strictly higher than she would otherwise obtain. Direct lenders provide the remaining, q a In order to invest in the good project, capitalist-i must earn an incentive compatible expected income. Moreover, the contract should satisfy each lender's participation constraint, that is, lenders should be guaranteed at least as much as they would earn on the international capital market. Combining these two constraints, we can show (see Appendix A.1 for details) that only capitalists with wealth exceeding a t would be able to obtain direct …nance, where
Indirect Finance
Indirect or intermediated …nance entails three parties to the contract: the bank, uninformed investors and the capitalist. An optimal contract here too stipulates that no one earns anything when the project fails. In case of success, total returns, t q, are divided up as
denoting the bank's returns. Besides the incentive compatibility constraint of the capitalist and the participation constraint of the uninformed investors, we have to take into account an additional incentive compatibility constraint, that for bank monitoring. Moreover the loan size has to be chosen optimally to maximize bank pro…ts subject to the capitalist's incentive constraint and the bank's incentive and resource constraints. Finally, the banking sector earns zero pro…ts in a competitive equilibrium.
Together these have the following implications (see Appendix A.1): (i) bank …nance is relatively more expensive than direct …nance (due to monitoring costs), that is, the (gross) return on bank loans, r L t ; is greater than r = G , the return promised to direct lenders in case of success
and (ii) capitalists with wealth a t > a i t a t ; where
7 Since project returns are observable and veri…able, optimal contracts between direct …nanciers and capitalists may be interpreted either as debt or as outside equity. For an equity contract, the capitalist sells a share s t of her project return, x U t = s t ( t q). For a debt contract, the capitalist borrows q a t , promising to repay a return of r = G in case of success. The implicit return on equity when projects succeed has to be r = G for both assets to be held simultaneously, that is, s t ( t q) = r (q a t )= G . Again, what matters is that neither of these is monitored lending. are able to convince uninformed investors to supply the remaining funds for the investment project only after the bank lends an amount (and agrees to monitor)
Capitalists with wealth level below a t cannot obtain any external …nance, direct or indirect.
Occupational Incomes
Denote individual-i's income by z i t . Consider the case where i does not obtain any external …nance since her wealth is too small, a i t a t . Her income consists of labor earnings and returns on investment in the domestic and/or international capital market
Next consider those who borrow both from banks and the market, that is, using mixed …nance. For these capitalists with a i t 2 [a t ; a t ), equations (5) and (7) imply that income from a successful project would be
wherer r = G . Failure gives them zero returns.
Finally, capitalists with adequate wealth, a i t a t , borrow only from the market and earn
from a successful project. Of course, we are assuming that the rate of return from the project ( t ) is high enough for the capitalist's participation constraint to be satis…ed. That is, we require that a capitalist's expected income G z i t is greater than r a i t , what she could earn for sure by investing her entire wealth on the domestic and international capital markets. This will be true under appropriate restrictions on and the …nal goods technology ( , A). 8 In order that the loan size does not exceed investment size, that is l i t q; monitoring costs should not be so high as to make it impossible for bank intermediation to resolve agency problems. Hence, we restrict monitoring cost to ( G B )= B . It is also natural to assume that a t > a t , or else there will be no demand for intermediation since monitoring would be too costly to be socially useful. This is true as long as the expected gain from monitoring exceeds
Earnings for each type of economic agent are thus given by
To summarize properties of optimal loan contracts and external …nancing choices, we note that given q > a i t and the wealth distribution G t , (i) individuals with a i t < a t are unable to obtain any external …nance and work as laborers;
(ii) individuals with a i t 2 [a t ; a t ) obtain external …nance from banks as well as households: they borrow an amount l i t from banks at the loan rate r L t , given by (5) and (7) above, agree to being monitored, and raise the remaining (q l i t a i t ) directly from investors at the rater ; optimal contracts guarantee these capitalists incentive compatible payments such that they behave diligently; (iii) individuals with a i t a t borrow only from investors, paying them a return ofr ; here too, incentive compatible payments to these capitalists ensure that investments occur in the good project; and (iv) income in each case is given by (8) above. Figure 1 outlines the decisions facing a representative agent ('…rm') born with assets a.
General Equilibrium in Period t
Once she becomes economically active, the agent makes occupational and …nancing decisions depending on how her assets compare to the wealth thresholds a and a. Individuals are sorted into three categories: those who work (no credit access), those who become capitalists using intermediated and unintermediated loans (mixed-…nance capitalists), and those who become capitalists by borrowing solely from the market (market-…nance capitalists).
Once investment outcomes are realized and …nal goods are produced, occupational incomes are determined according to (8) . Wealth transfers are subsequently made to o¤springs ('continuing …rms') as speci…ed by (1) .
Parametric assumptions we make below ensure that workers earn a strictly lower income than either type of capitalist. Moreover, market-…nance capitalists earn a higher expected income than mixed-…nance capitalists (see equation (8)). Which of the three occupations an individual falls into is hence solely determined by her wealth. If wealth were not a constraint, all agents would want to become market-…nance capitalists.
Consider the economy at time t. Denote the fractions of the three types of agents by (f 1t ; f 2t ; f 3t ), where
There are f 1t workers and 1 f 1t capitalists at any instant t. Given the law of large numbers, G proportion of these capitalists succeed in producing capital, amounting to K j t = q each, where j denotes a successful capitalist. The aggregate capital stock is then
and the workforce N t = f 1t . Capital per worker is, thus,
Since all successful capitalists produce the same amount of capital, given w t , they hire the same number of workers
Note the private technology (2). In equilibrium, substituting for the labor augmenting technological progress ((3) and (9)) into this production function gives output produced by a successful capitalist as Y j t = A q: Under competitive markets, the equilibrium wage rate is given by the private marginal product of capital,
A successful capitalist then earns the income b Y j t = A q, net of wage payments w t N j t , from her capital q. The (gross) rate of return on capital, which we de…ned as t above, is clearly equal to A, the private marginal product of capital, that is,
Due to overall constant returns to capital, this return is time-invariant. Since all successful capitalists earn the same return on capital, we assume, without loss of generality, that they produce …nal goods using only their own capital.
Using the equilibrium return on capital from (11) the cuto¤ wealth levels de…ned by (6) and (4) now do not depend upon time:
where
It remains to check whether or not a worker earns lower income than a capitalist. This is by no means guaranteed. For instance, when there are "too few" workers, the marginal product of labor may be so high that even individuals who could have obtained external …nance choose to work. It turns out that this happens when the proportion of creditconstrained agents falls below e f 1 , where e f 1 satis…es
We restrict ourselves to empirically plausible distributions, those that are positively skewed.
We assume hence that G 0 satis…es f 10 > e f 1 . This ensures that occupational "choice"is stable over time and we can simply focus on the proportions of the three types of agents without having to worry about the e¤ect of income on occupational dynamics.
Dynamics of Financial Development and Structure
The …nancial system, by which we mean the degree to which an economy relies upon external …nance in general, and bank and market-…nance in particular, is determined by access to credit markets. Drawing upon the instantaneous equilibrium from the previous section, we now consider the evolution of this …nancial system.
Given an initial wealth distribution G 0 , wealth thresholds a and a determine the proportion of individuals able to borrow and the relative composition of bank-and market-…nance in aggregate investment. These investment choices lead to income realizations that determine the subsequent distribution through bequests. The process continues recursively, with changes in the …nancial system tracking the wealth distribution through time. 9 Parametric restrictions in footnotes 5 and 8 ensure that 1 < 2 < 1:
Substituting labor and capital's equilibrium returns into (8) , and using optimal bequests
(1), we obtain the intergenerational law of motion:
(1 ) Note that all three regimes of (13) are piecewise linear. For this mapping to converge we need to rule out the possibility that a dynasty can get arbitrary rich over time by simply reinvesting its wealth. This is ensured by (1 )r < 1.
We would also like to rule out a dynasty from being able to self-…nance its entire investment. When investment succeeds, the …xed-point of the mapping for a t 2 [a; 1) is given by
. For this to be less than q, we assume that
Since investment is undertaken only if the return from it ( A ) is greater than the return to be paid to lenders, (r ), this is su¢ cient to ensure (1 )r < 1. We maintain it henceforth and, without loss of generality, restrict ourselves to distributions on the domain [0; a U ].
It is important to note the nonlinearity of the distributional dynamics. The current wealth distribution and threshold a determine the size of the working class (f 1t ) which then determines equilibrium wages through (10) . This endogeneity of the wage rate gives rise to nonlinear dynamics since the future wealth distribution depends upon wages via optimal bequests. The dynamic behavior of such systems can be quite complicated (see for example Aghion and Bolton, 1997). Fortunately it is su¢ cient for our purpose to simply track the evolution of (f 1t ; f 2t ; f 3t ) instead of conducting a complete characterization of the wealth dynamics. 10 A couple of features of our model simpli…es the task. In the …rst place, there is no feedback from the wealth distribution to a and a, which are independent of 10 We are interested in two features of a …nancial system, its depth and structure. Financial depth is captured by (1 f 1t ) , the proportion of unconstrained borrowers, while the …nancial structure is characterized by the relative measure of capitalists relying on bank-…nance (f 2t ) and market-…nance (f 3t ).
time. 11 Secondly, constant returns to capital at the aggregate level ( t = A) guarantees that recursion dynamics for wealth levels exceeding a is independent of time. 12 Speci…cally, wealth dynamics for the two upper categories are not a¤ected by the endogeneity of the wage rate which impacts only working-class dynamics. By exploiting the feature of the investment technology that failure yields zero returns, here too we are able to precisely characterize the
dynamics.
In what follows we analyze the evolution of the …nancial system in two stages. First we look at the general development of the system (…nancial depth). Then we discuss factors that determine the structure of a developed …nancial system if it were to result in the long run.
Financial Development
The degree of credit rationing among potential capitalists determines the depth of a …nancial system. Hence the simplest measure of …nancial development comes from observing the movement of f 1 .
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As a point of reference, it will be useful to keep in mind the ideal …nancial system -one where wealth is no constraint on borrowing (for instance, if monitoring were costless in which case there would also be no distinction between monitored and non-monitored lending). Since individuals are ex ante identical, this means workers and entrepreneurs must earn the same expected income in equilibrium. It is easy to show that this implies an allocation of people between wage employment and entrepreneurship, say f 1 , which is lower thanf 1 . Starting from an initial f 10 >f 1 , the economy instantaneously jumps to this f 1 . But, as we show below, in a world with credit frictions, equilibrium …nancial depth (1 f 1 ) is always lower than what we would observe in the ideal system. How far it departs from the ideal system is, however, what we are interested in.
We begin with Figure 2 . 14 Suppose that a t fraction of the f 1t working dynasties leave bequests exceeding a. This means o¤springs of these t f 1t workers will be able to borrow and become capitalists. Figures 2(a) -(c) di¤er only in the position of the lowest regime relative to a, and hence, in t .
In Figure 2 (a), the wealth recursion line for [0; a) lies entirely above a so that t = 1. This happens when the wage rate is high enough, that is, when there are relatively few workers:
We characterize dynamics on the two-dimensional unit simplex in (f 1 ; f 3 ).
this is su¢ cient to determine the time-path of f 2t . Suppressing time subscripts, transition dynamics when f 1 f 1 is given by the pair of di¤erential equations
The …rst equation follows from noting that the out ‡ow from the stock of workers is f 1 whereas the in ‡ow comes from the fraction (1 G ) of capitalists who su¤er losses on their investment and lose their entire wealth. The mass of workers, f 1 , decreases or increases over time according to whether f 1 exceeds (1
The second di¤erential equation is obtained similarly: the stock of market-…nance capitalists increases as long as mixed-…nance capitalists moving up, G f 2 , are more numerous than market-…nance capitalists su¤ering losses, (1 G )f 3 . Now turn to Figure 3 for the phase-plane: when f 1 f 1 , the _ f 1 = 0 locus is given by the equation 
The corresponding transition dynamics is given by:
…nance only.
In Figures 3(a) and (b), the _ f 1 = 0 locus is given by f 1 = 1 and the _ f 3 = 0 locus by
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A third possibility arises when the wealth recursion line on [0; a) lies neither fully above nor fully below a. This occurs for f 1 < f 1 < f 1 . In Figure 2( results in a bulging of the distribution at zero; hence such an increase further reduces t .
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In addition, t is a continuous function of f 1t . The continuous time demographic structure and a continuous initial distribution imply that changes in G t and f 1t (and hence in e a t ) occur in a continuous fashion. Thus t , de…ned by 1 G t (e a t )=f 1t , also moves continuously with
We can therefore specify the dynamics corresponding to Figure 2 (c) by the di¤erential equations:
Appendix A.2 demonstrates the existence of the _ f 1 = 0 locus for a continuous (f 1t ). Multiple such loci are possible but, generically, there will be an odd number of these.
Figures 3(a) and (b) illustrate dynamics under one and three such loci respectively. In both cases, when f 10 f 1 , point D represents a locally stable stationary distribution, while point L is a locally stable stationary distribution for f 10 > f 1 . Point D, in fact, represents a well-developed …nancial system and is given by (f 1 ; f 2 ; f 3 ) = 16 Note the crucial role played by the investment technology. If failure resulted in low, but positive, returns, we would need more information about the distribution to determine how t responds to G t . likewise represents a less-developed …nancial system. Indeed, there we have (f 1 ; f 2 ; f 3 ) = (1; 0; 0), that is, a complete collapse of the …nancial structure.
In Figure 3 . In addition to the developed and underdeveloped …nancial systems, we now have a third kind, a moderately developed …nancial structure, at point M .
The complete collapse of the …nancial system at point L is an unattractive outcome, a consequence of there being no way out of the working class when f 1 > f 1 . We eliminate this extreme outcome by perturbing the dynamics slightly. We do so by allowing a very small probability ( ) of moving up from working-to middle-class, a probability that corresponds to winning a lottery or some other form of windfall gain not captured by the model. Figure 3(c) . When f 1 f 1 , this perturbation does not alter the wealth dynamics since t = 1. When f 1 > f 1 , perturbed wealth dynamics is given by
The phase diagram for one such perturbation is
The perturbed locus _ Recall that f 10 G 0 (a): Clearly, f 10 depends on the initial distribution (G 0 ) and on the factors that determine a -investment size (q) and institutional parameters (v and ). 17 We consider these determinants one by one.
Inequality and Financial Development
Wealth distribution is a key predictor of …nancial development. Suppose a high value of f 10 results from a highly unequal initial distribution. Figure 3 shows how a developed …nancial system (D) results for values of f 10 less than f 1 , that is, for a relatively equal distribution. Under a relatively unequal distribution, individual wealth levels will be more commonly below a. When f 10 > f 1 , these inequities hamper development leading to a 'collapse'of credit transactions (Figures 3(a) and 3(b) ), or more plausibly, an underdeveloped …nancial system (Figure 3(c) ). For moderate degrees of inequality such that f 1 < f 10 < f 1 , outcomes depend upon the existence of additional stationary distributions. Persistent …nancial underdevelopment results in Figure 3 This is all the more evident when we contrast middle-income countries in East Asia and Latin America. East Asia's better asset and income distribution has received considerable attention in the development literature; 19 our model relates how this di¤erence may have 18 For …nancial development, we use Levine's (2002) "Finance Aggregate" measure (Column 4, 
Investment Size
Consider next the e¤ect of investment size (q). An increase in q raises the cuto¤ a, given the wealth distribution. This could lead to …nancial underdevelopment if the economy is pushed over b
1 . An immediate implication is that poorer countries which are characterized by high inequality, such as Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, ought to rely more on smalland medium-scale industries for their development. An emphasis on import-substituting heavy industries, for instance, would be counterproductive in the long-run.
Institutional Factors

Individuals do not di¤er in terms of their innate abilities in our model and access to credit markets is limited solely by informational asymmetries and costs. A relevant question is how better institutions mitigate these asymmetries and what that implies for …nancial structure.
A simple way to interpret institutions here is through the parameters , v and V . These parameters a¤ect the depth and structure of a …nancial system through the nature and magnitude of agency problems and costs of controlling it.
As noted earlier, the degree of credit-rationing, f 10 
Financial Structure
Financial structure refers to the combination of …nancial instruments, markets and institutions operating in an economy (Goldsmith, 1969) . We consider the relative importance of 20 See Table 2 in Levine (2002) and Table 3 .12 in Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine (2001b) . market-and bank-…nance, t f 3t =f 2t , as an index of structure in our model and study its evolution.
In the analysis so far we have implicitly allowed high investment returns to ensure that successful mixed-…nance capitalists move up to the next wealth category. What if that were not the case? We illustrate such a scenario in Figure 5 which depicts wealth recursion dynamics for f 1 f 1 (the other two cases would parallel Figures 2(b) and (c) ). It turns out that the nature of the transition dynamics does not change here although the composition of the stationary distribution does.
Transition dynamics corresponding to Figure 5 is given by:
when
and when f 1 < f 1 < f 1 ;
In Figure 6 (a), when f 10 f 1 ; D represents a locally stable stationary distribution with a 'developed'…nancial system, where
point L represents a locally stable stationary distribution representing a 'less-developed' …nancial system with (f 1 ; f 2 ; f 3 ) = (1; 0; 0), and when f a 1 < f 10 < f c 1 , point M represents a moderately developed …nancial system. Not surprisingly, the long-run distribution has no capitalist relying purely on market …nance since middle-class capitalists cannot move up.
As before, such an outcome can be avoided with perturbations that allow workers to move up to the middle-class with a small probability ( ), and middle-class capitalists to move up with a similar probability ("). Under perturbation, the stationary distributions in Figure   6 A market-based system (Figure 2 ) occurs when the height of C exceeds a, that is when,
This is more likely to occur when V is relatively low and v relatively high, or when is relatively high but G low (holding G constant). 21 On the other hand a bank-based …nancial system ( Figure 5 ) results when the height of H is less than a. This happens if
This inequality is more likely when V and are relatively high, or, holding G constant, when is relatively low and G high. 22 Thus, the …nancial structure of an economy is determined by the investment technology ( G ; ) and institutional factors ( , v and V ). We consider these issues next.
Investment Risk
Although banks and individuals are risk-neutral in our model, investment risk a¤ects …nancial structure through its e¤ect on wealth dynamics. We begin by contrasting two types of investment that yield the same expected return, G : type-I projects yield a high but are riskier since G is low, while type-II projects succeed more often but realize low . 23 Suppose now that the two project types di¤er signi…cantly in their riskiness so that Figure 2 depicts wealth dynamics for type-I projects while that for type-II projects is given by Figure 5 . From (14) and (15) we know that Figure 2 is more likely to occur when is relatively high but G low (holding G constant) while Figure 5 is more likely to occur for the opposite case. Figures 3 and 6 respectively. We draw two conclusions on the role of investment risk. First, lower G leads to higher f 1 so that credit rationing is more widespread in the long-run. Secondly, when investment is less risky, all or a large proportion of eligible capitalists go through bank intermediation in the long-run. In 21 We allow for a proportionate decrease in B as well. 22 Again, we change B by the same proportion as G : 23 We allow for a proportionate change in B between the two project types.
Figures 2 and 5 lead to dynamics shown by
other words, bank-…nance is relatively more important for safer technologies, whereas market …nance gains importance for riskier ones.
This dependence of …nancial structure on risk is quite distinct from, but complementary to, the ones commonly analyzed in the …nance literature. Speci…cally, since agents are riskneutral our analysis misses the typical portfolio e¤ect discussed in the literature. 24 At the same time it brings to the analysis the macroeconomic feedback that investment risk has on asset positions and …nancing dynamics, an e¤ect entirely absent from the existing literature.
Nature of Institutions
Institutional parameters also a¤ect long run …nancial structure in the model. Recall that a market-based system is more likely to occur (that is, (14) holds) when V is relatively low and v relatively high. On the other hand, a bank-based system (condition (15) It may seem surprising that higher monitoring costs, , lead to a more bank-oriented systems even though these costs are borne by the banking sector. This is easy to understand once we recognize that wealth and …nancing dynamics depend upon investment earnings.
A higher cost of monitoring means that banks need to inject a larger amount of their own resources into the investment project. This forces mixed-…nance capitalists to rely more heavily on expensive intermediated …nance; consequently less of them are able to move up to become market-…nance capitalists.
6 Further Discussion
Historical Implications
Several of the model's implications shed light on the development of …nancial systems during the Industrial Revolution. 24 Risk averse agents would clearly make the analysis much less tractable. It is to be noted, though, that the literature is not unequivocal about whether banks or markets diversify risks better, suggesting only that both are important. Levine (1997) and Allen and Gale (2001) discuss these issues.
Inequality and Financial Structure
Consider …rst the e¤ect of initial inequality on …nancing choices. For convenience, assume that the initial distribution is lognormal with mean 0 and variance 2 0 , where a < 0 < a. In Appendix A.3 we establish that an increase in 2 0 tends to raise f 10 , lower f 20 but increase f 30 . Higher inequality leads to thinner capital markets since 1 f 10 is lower. But among those who obtain loans, there is a shift toward market …nance and away from bank …nance, increasing the ratio 0 . Historical reliance upon the two types of …nance may, in other words, depend upon inequality.
This prediction seems to be corroborated by what we know about England and Germany during the industrial revolution. The Anglo-Saxon …nancial system, with its creditors pursuing more of a "hands-o¤"lending, was more market-oriented. Banks were mostly concerned with liquidity and did not engage in long-term lending so that British industries primarily depended upon internal …nance and the London Stock Exchange for their …nancing needs At the same time, substantial evidence suggests England had a more unequal land distribution than Germany (and France) (Clapham, 1936 , Soltow, 1968 ). Landes (1969) also notes that a large number of British industrialists were "men of substance", having accumulated signi…cant wealth from merchant activities. This distributional di¤erence between the two regions could partly explain why the Anglo-Saxon and German …nancial systems have historically di¤ered. Indeed, this also explains why other societies with better distributions than England, for instance France and Japan (or the newly industrializing East Asian countries), have traditionally relied more on bank-…nance (see Allen and Gale, 2000) . A systematic analysis covering a broad sample of countries is clearly required to establish this relationship.
There is an important point to be noted here. The initial distribution has no permanent impact on …nancial structure as long as countries similar in other respects are converging to the same (developed) …nancial system. Interestingly, Allen and Gale (2000) point out how there has been a convergence of …nancial systems in developed countries as traditionally bank-oriented societies such as France, Germany or Japan have moved closer toward market …nance since the 1980s. One could interpret this as a convergence in industrialized country …nancial systems (policies, which are exogenous here, would have clearly played a role too).
Investment Size and Financial Structure
Investment size (q) has an impact on initial (historical) …nancial structure. With a higher q, fewer individuals are able to obtain loans either from markets or from banks. At the same time, the shortfall q a i that has to be raised through external …nance is higher for those who do invest. The Holmstrom-Tirole incentive structure has a straightforward implication:
due to limited liability, a borrower's incentive to be diligent is weaker the less her personal stake in the project is, that is, the more she needs to borrow. The only way to attenuate this is through increased monitoring.
Higher investment requirements would hence push an economy towards bank …nance. But whether or not this happens depends also on the wealth distribution. A higher q raises the importance of bank-…nance under two conditions: when the initial wealth distribution among capitalists is more equitable, that is when f 30 =f 20 is low; and when banks are particularly e¤ective at resolving incentive problems ( 1 << 2 in (12)) so that the measure of individuals above a is sizeable. 25 Historical evidence, once again, provides some support of this story. Similar to their …nan-cial systems, a distinction is often made between England and Germany's industrialization patterns. The British process of industrialization mainly relied upon small-and mediumscale industries, textile manufacturing being a prime example. Germany, on the other hand, largely utilized heavy manufacturing and chemical industries for its development, both requiring far greater investment than in the case of England (see Landes, 1969 , and related references in Baliga and Polak, 2004) . Consistent with the evidence, our model suggests that this technological di¤erence would be re ‡ected in a greater German reliance on intermediated …nance especially if banks are e¢ cient intermediaries and the wealth distribution is more equitable.
Using a static model of monitored and non-monitored debt, Baliga and Polak (2004) highlight the role of investment size for Western Europe's …nancial structure. 26 Our dynamic model suggests, though, that di¤erences in …nancial structure are neutral in the long run with respect to investment size. As long as f 10 < b f 1 (or less than f a 1 ), di¤erences in f 10 do not translate into di¤erences in the stationary distribution, that is, point D. This is because q a¤ects threshold wealth requirements (a and a) as well as expected income from investment.
In the short-run, a higher q could increase reliance upon bank-…nance but it also enables successful capitalists to earn more. When more of the middle-class capitalists move above a, they do not need to be monitored so that reliance upon bank …nance declines.
The general equilibrium dynamics also suggests a second important way investment size a¤ects outcomes, by giving rise to threshold e¤ects. For a given initial wealth distribution, the greater the capital needs of industrialization, the more likely it is that f 10 >f 1 in which case the …nancial system will continue to remain underdeveloped. The question of whether banks or markets are more important for …rms'…nancing needs becomes less relevant in such a scenario.
Life-Cycle of Firms
A conventional wisdom in corporate …nance visualizes a …rm's life-cycle as follows: the …rm relies mostly on internal assets and venture capitalists (the so-called 'angels') for investment in its early stages; as it matures, …nancial intermediaries start lending to the …rm; …nally, when the …rm is mature enough, it raises funds from the market. This is the pattern implied, for example, by Myers' (1984) pecking order theory of …-nance. 27 Diamond ( This also means a blind push towards one type of external …nance in developing countries, as we have seen in the last two decades, is ‡awed without taking into account the deeper problems a¤ecting these …nancial systems. Policies regarding patterns of industrialization, banking, transparency and availability of information on borrowing …rms, can a¤ect not just current …rm …nancing choices but the ability to access credit markets over time and to invest in industries that require a heavy dose of investment or those that are particularly risky.
Policy Considerations
We draw several policy conclusions from the model. Another goal of policy can be to push one type of …nancing over another -as we have seen recently -in order to increase aggregate income. In this economy both bank-based and market-based systems generate the same GDP, but GNP di¤ers. Speci…cally, Appendix A.4
shows that market-based systems generate a higher GNP. Policies to raise GNP would then involve promoting market-…nance. Better disclosure and bankruptcy laws will of course help by lowering V . But banking sector reforms can help too. While lowering is desirable both as a temporary and permanent policy, lowering v helps only as a temporary policy. Lowering v via legal reforms like better protection of creditor rights and improving the bank's role as an enforcer and protector of these creditor rights enhances the reach of the banking sector (lowers a). This is good in the short run as less individuals are credit-constrained, but not so good in the long run since bank monitoring costs constitute a resource drain. Thus, unless this policy is coupled with policies to reduce or V (both of which help capitalists accumulate wealth faster), the result may be an undesirable (again for generating higher GNP) bank-based system. 28 
Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the evolution of a …nancial system and identi…ed factors determining its development and structure. We introduced monitored bank loans and non-monitored tradeable securities in a dynamic general equilibrium model and showed how the path to …nancial development exhibits non-ergodic behavior -underdeveloped …nancial systems persist in highly unequal societies and in economies with capital-intensive industries or ine¢ cient legal and …nancial institutions. The model's key predictions are consistent with the historical development of …nancial systems during the Industrial Revolution. We also show that the 28 The relative attractiveness of a market-based system needs to be quali…ed. Here we have abstracted from growth and assumed that credit-constrained borrowers become workers instead of engaging in low-productive 'traditional' entrepreneurial activities which may not bene…t as much from industrialization. We address these issues in a companion piece, Chakraborty and Ray (2006) , by abstracting from the distributional complications of this paper. There we show that a bank-based system has better distributional outcomes than market-based ones (though neither is necessarily better for growth). So how one views the desirability of one …nancial system over another depends on the relative emphasis placed on aggregate income versus wealth/income distribution.
typical life-cycle …nancing decisions of a …rm, as envisioned by papers in corporate …nance, can be hamstrung by weak macroeconomic fundamentals and policy parameters. Finally we shed light on the banks-versus-market policy debate that has in ‡uenced much of …nancial sector reforms around the world.
Compared to existing works on the dynamic interaction between credit markets and the wealth distribution, our goal has been to obtain a clearer understanding of what drives the development and structure of …nancial systems. Hence an important contribution of this paper lies in extending the literature by incorporating elements that allow policy analysis for developing countries.
We conclude by considering some extensions for future work. Throughout the paper we focused on the demand side of …nancial systems. We did this primarily for tractability.
A natural extension would be to consider how important the supply of loanable funds is to …nancial structure, for example, by looking at a closed economy version of the model. A more challenging extension would be to capture the emergence of di¤erent …nancial institutions (institutions like banks and markets are taken as given in our story). For instance, if there are …xed costs to setting up an intermediary (as in Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990) , the extent to which banks emerge and monitor lending will depend upon, and a¤ect, the pattern of wealth accumulation. It will be also interesting to endogenize the interest rate, allowing the wealth distribution to a¤ect …nancial structure through returns to bank and market-…nance.
Another institutional aspect we have ignored, and one likely to be important in development, is the quality of bank monitoring. In particular, banks do not face any incentive problems vis-a-vis depositors in our model. Extensions incorporating agency problems within the banking sector may be used to examine how the "quality"of bank-…nance itself changes over time and with respect to macro-fundamentals.
A.1. Optimal Contracts Direct Finance
We have x Capitalist's incentive compatibility constraint implies
Using this, the lender's participation constraint gives a threshold wealth level for access to direct …nance r q a
Indirect Finance
Under indirect …nance we have
Here the optimal contracts need to satisfy the following three constraints: (i) capitalist-i's incentive compatibility constraint (choosing the good project):
(ii) bank's incentive constraint (for monitoring):
assuming that banks discount monitoring costs at their opportunity cost, r , (iii) participation constraint of the uninformed investors:
where l i t is the amount that the bank lends to capitalist-i.
The bank's return from lending l i t to capitalist-i is
where r L t is the (gross) loan rate charged to borrowers when projects succeed. But the bank's incentive constraint implies
Since bank …nance is relatively more expensive than direct …nance (due to monitoring costs), borrowers accept only the minimum amount necessary so that
Capitalist's incentive compatibility constraint implies
. Then
Using this, the uninformed investors'participation constraint gives
It follows that only capitalists with wealth
are able to convince uninformed investors to supply enough funds for the investment project.
The Bank' s Problem
The competitive banking sector is pro…t maximizing. The aggregate demand for bank loans
where I t denotes the subset of individuals using intermediated …nance. The total monitoring cost borne by the banking sector is then
Let D t denotes the ‡ow of deposits into the banking sector. Expected banking pro…ts are
Banks face the resource constraint that total loans cannot exceed total deposits net of monitoring costs:
The banking sector's optimization problem in period t is to choose L t so as to maximize B t subject to the capitalist's incentive constraint and the constraints (17) and (21) .
Since bank pro…ts are increasing in total loans, (21) holds with equality:
Moreover, in a competitive equilibrium, the banking sector earns zero expected pro…ts. From
It follows from equations (22) and (23) that
and
Hence, using (18), we observe that
In other words, for all i 2 I t , banks …nance a …xed proportion of the borrower's investment, irrespective of a i t . Taking into account the optimal loan size (25), the lower wealth cut-o¤ (19) becomes
A.2. Existence of _ f 1 = 0 locus when f 1 < f 1 < f 1
In the text we have already established that t is a continuous and monotonically decreasing function of f 1t . Now de…ne A.4 GNP Calculations GNP = GDP + Net interest income from abroad (NIA). Since GDP is the same in both systems (the number of workers and capitalists are the same under both systems and these are the only two factors of production), let us concentrate on NIA. Assume that workers supply their savings to the domestic …nancial sector …rst, and then invest any excess on the international capital market. Similarly, the domestic …nancial sector …rst relies on the domestic lonable funds market before approaching the international capital market. Since banks and entrepreneurs pay the world rate of return, r (in an expected sense), the loan market always clears.
Demand for loanable funds = demand from banks seeking deposits (D t ) + demand from entrepreneurs seeking direct …nance (M t ). The last term in this expression makes it clear that the amount spent on monitoring bankdependent capitalists is a drain from investible resources. Clearly, the second term in the expression for N LA t is the same under either system and the third term is higher (in absolute value) under the bank-based system (as the resource drain due to monitoring cost is higher). We will establish that the …rst term is higher under the market-based system. First, in a developed …nancial system, from t > 0 onwards all workers are simply o¤springs of capitalists whose investments failed, so that a i t = 0. This is also true in steady state. Hence Next consider the remaining G =(2 G ) bank-dependent capitalists in a bank-based system and the G =(2 G ) market-dependent capitalists in a market-based system. Comparing   Figures 2(a) and 5 it is clear that each of the market-dependent capitalist is wealthier than any bank-dependent capitalist -the wealth of the market-dependent capitalists is distributed along the bequest line EF in Figure 2(a) whereas that of the bank-dependent capitalists is distributed along the bequest line CH in Figure 5 .
Hence a market-based system yields higher GNP.
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